Texas Holdem Strategy
THE DYNAMICS OF STRATEGY -- PART 2
by: Lou Krieger
Last month we talked about the need to apply strategic concepts
in a dynamic fashion, as a requisite of "perfect play."
This month we'll look at some very specific examples and their consequences.
About ten years ago I read a book titled Conceptual Blockbusting,
which deals with the techniques of problem solving. One of the book's
main points is this: the way in which a problem is defined often
has a great deal to do with the solution. This was referred to as
"bounding" the problem, and bounding issues come up all
the time at the poker table.
Here's a common example. When you sit down to play, are you attempting
to win the most pots or the most money? If you think you are there
to win the most pots your strategy will be very, very different
than it would be if you were trying to win the most money. For starters,
if you want to win every pot, the best way to do that is simply
to play every pot. Do that, however, and you'll soon be on the rail.
If you want to win the most money, be selective, be aggressive when
you have the best of it, and you have a chance to be a long time
winner.
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But you can see clearly from this very simple example, that the
way in which you defined or "bounded" the problem, pointed
you strongly in the direction of one or another strategic choice.
Even world class professionals make the mistake of "bounding
the problem incorrectly." This situation occurred at the final
table of the main event of a major poker tournament. Three players
remained: At that point, Player A had almost twice the number of
chips of either of his opponents, who were approximately equal in
chip position. The payoffs were as follows: $230,000 to first place,
$115,000 for second, and $55,200 for third. In a heads-up situation
against Player A, Player B went all in on the flop when two diamonds
fell, giving him a flush draw. It was all or nothing for Player
B at the moment he made the decision to go all in and draw for his
flush. Either the flush would come and Player B would win the hand,
double his stack, and be solidly in second place, or else he would
be out of the tournament. With two cards to come he had a 35 percent
chance of making his hand and a 65 percent chance of busting out
of the tournament.
Even if he did win that hand, however, he had no guarantee that
he would either win the tournament or even capture second place.
Thus he allowed himself to take a position as a 1.9:1 underdog in
a situation where even if he overcame those odds, he had no guarantee
of a higher payoff in the tournament. As it happened, Player B's
flush never came, while Player C made a remarkable comeback and
went on to defeat Player A, who was the chip leader at the time
this confrontation occurred. But the big winner in the confrontation
between Players A and B was Player C and he wasn't even in the hand.
He went from a virtual tie for second/third place to a guarantee
of second place money. This was a difference of $59,800. Remember,
Player C, who had absolutely nothing at risk in that confrontation
would have been a winner regardless of the result. With Player B
knocked out of the tournament, Player C guaranteed himself a payoff
which was $59,800 more than he could count on before that hand was
played. If Player B won the hand, Player C would have still been
in third place, but Player A would no longer have had a big chip
lead and no longer in a position to hammer the shorter stacks with
relentless bets and raises.
But why would a top tournament player like Hal Kant make the strategic
decision to contest that pot, as an underdog, when the risk clearly
outweighed the reward? Well a deal could already have been cut between
the three of them. If an agreement had been made, they were only
playing for the glory at that point, with the payout having already
been decided. But if that was not the case, then it is very likely
that Hal Kant was so focused in on the situation at hand that he
was, in that instant, unable to step back and grasp the issue in
its broadest context. If this was true he simply was not aware (at
the point of his decision) that Cloutier also had a major stake
in the outcome of that hand, even though he held no cards.
Just this momentary lack of awareness, entirely natural when you
consider the intense concentration required to survive as one of
the final three in a $10,000 buy in no-limit hold'em tournament,
could easily lead to an error in correctly bounding a problem. In
so doing the wrong strategy was selected. In the latter stages of
a tournament, anytime someone is knocked out you stand to improve
your own payoff position. Clearly T.J. Cloutier was contained within
the boundaries of this problem, even though he was not in contention
for the pot. Moreover, he was assured of being either a small winner,
or a big winner, at absolutely no risk to himself. He went on to
win the tournament, and this hand -- which he had no active role
in -- might have been the decisive one.
We'll talk more about dynamic strategy in issues to come, but for
now just realize that no one, not even world class professionals,
are immune from the implications of incorrect strategic selections.
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